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Abstract
We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives
when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000)
shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manip-
ulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-
richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the nite-
ness of the set of alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness.
However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove the
same result under a weaker condition thanmonotonical closedness.
Keywords: Social Choice, Strategy-Proofness, Bribe-Proofness, Transfer-
able Utility, Constancy.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of selecting one point from an interval or a multi-
dimensional set, based on valuations reported by participants, when monetary
transfers between two agents are possible. In this environment, Schummer (2000)
introduced the concept of bribe-proofnesswhich rules outmanipulation through
monetary transfers andhe proved in Theorem4 that a social choice function sat-
ises bribe-proofness if and only if it is a constant function.
In this paper, we generalize Schummer's result. Under a domain-richness
condition, we rst prove that any bribe-proof rule must be an exclusive rule,
where at least one agent always has no inuence upon social decisions. Strength-
ening the condition, we second prove that any bribe-proof rule must be a con-
stant rule, where every agent always does not have any inuence upon social
decisions. The second theorem implies Schummer's Theorem 4which he proves
under two kinds of domain-richness conditions: (a) either smooth connected-
ness1 or the niteness of the set of alternatives and (b) monotonical closedness.
This is because we alternatively prove the theorem without the former condi-
tion and under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness. Our domain-
richness condition is dened from the viewpoint of the interconnection among
valuation functions rather than the sort of valuation functions admissible for
each agent.
In this social choice environment there have been a considerable number of
contributions since Moulin's seminal work (Moulin (1980)), where he rst char-
acterized the class of peak-only strategy-proof2 rules. Recently Ching (1997) of-
fered an alternative characterization of the class. It is now believed that, with-
out monetary transfers, the median voter rule3 is preferable because it satises
strategy-proofness. However, it is also known that the median voter rule is ma-
nipulable if monetary transfers are possible. In the case where monetary trans-
fers are possible, even if a rule satises strategy-proofness, each agent could be
better off by another agent's misrepresentations, so that both agents could ben-
et by means of monetary transfers if they cooperate with each other.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notation and
denitions. In Section 3, we provide our results. In Section 4, we state some
conclusions.
1Holmström (1979) provided smoothly connectedness to generalize the characterization of
Clark-Groves mechanisms to such domains.
2Strategy-proofness is the requirement that each agent cannot be better off by his/her own
misrepresentations regardless of the other agents' representations.
3The median voter rule is the social choice function that selects the median of the peaks of
represented valuations.
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2 Notation and Denitions
Let N :Æ {1,2, . . . ,n}, where #N ¸ 2, be the set of agents. Let X ½ R` be the set of
alternatives. For each agent i 2 N , let mi 2 R be agent i 's initial endowment of
a numeraire,money, which is used for utility transfers. For each agent i 2N , let
ti j 2 R be a transfer of the numeraire from agent i to j . We assume that each
agent has enoughmoney to transfer.4
For each agent i 2 N , let £i ½ R be a set of agent i 's types, which each pre-
scribe his/her preference over X . Each agent i 2 N has a continuous valua-
tion function vi : X ££i ! R, which associates a real number with each alter-
native x 2 X and each type µi 2 £i . Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a quasi-
linear utility function over X £R, and utility is fully transferable across agents
through money. A domain is a set £ :Æ £1££2£¢¢ ¢££n . A type prole is a list
µ Æ (µ1,µ2, . . . ,µn) 2£.
A social choice function is a single-valued function f : £! X , which asso-
ciates a non-empty alternative x 2 X with each type prole µ 2£.
Now we introduce some properties of social choice functions. The rst two
properties refer to the inuence of agents upon social decisions. To formulate
these, we provide additional notation. Given i 2 N and µ¡i 2 £¡i , the option
set is the set Oi (µ¡i ) :Æ
©
x 2 X j x Æ f (µi ,µ¡i ) for some µi 2£i
ª
. This is the set of
alternatives that agent i can obtain by varying his type when the other agents
represent µ¡i .
An exclusive rule is a social choice function that always neglects any type
represented by at least one agent. A constant rule, which is a special case of the
exclusive rule, is a social choice function that does not reect any type reported
by any agent.
Denition 1 (An Exclusive Rule). A social choice function f is exclusive if there
exists i 2N such that for all µ¡i 2£¡i ,Oi (µ¡i ) is a singleton.
Denition 2 (A Constant Rule). A social choice function f is constant if, for all
i 2N and all µ¡i 2£¡i ,Oi (µ¡i ) is a singleton.
Remark 1. We usually dene constant rules as follows: a social choice function
f is constant if, for all µ,µ0 2£, we have f (µ)Æ f (µ0). Our denition is equivalent
to this.
Nextwe introduce an incentive compatibility condition, which requires each
agent to have no incentive to misrepresent his/her types to benet whether the
other agents misrepresent or not.
Denition 3 (Strategy-Proofness). A social choice function f satises strategy-
proofness if, for all µ 2£ and all i 2N , there exists no µ0i 2£i such that
vi ( f (µi ,µ¡i ),µi )Ç vi ( f (µ0i ,µ¡i ),µi ).
4This is because we eliminate the case where an agent cannot bribe another for lack of money.
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Finallyweprovide another incentive compatibility condition, which requires
each agent to have no incentive to bribe another agent tomisrepresent to jointly
benet, irrespective of what the other agents represent.
Denition4 (Bribe-Proofness). A social choice function f satises bribe-proofness
if, for all µ 2£ and all i , j 2N , there exists no t j i 2R and µ0i 2£i such that(
vi ( f (µi ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µi )Ç vi ( f (µ0i ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µi )Å t j i
v j ( f (µi ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µ j )Ç v j ( f (µ0i ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µ j )¡ t j i ,
that is, for all µ 2£ and all i , j 2N , there exists no µ0i 2£i such that
vi ( f (µi ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µi )Å v j ( f (µi ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µ j )
Ç vi ( f (µ0i ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µi )Å v j ( f (µ0i ,µ j ,µ¡i , j ),µ j ).
The concept of bribe-proofness was rst dened by Schummer (see Schum-
mer (2000) for a more detailed discussion). Note that bribe-proofness implies
strategy-proofness by our choosing i Æ j .
3 Results
As Schummer (2000) proves, a social choice function f satises bribe-proofness
if and only if it is constant. But he requires two assumptions about the domain.
One is either smooth connectedness5 or the niteness of the set of alternatives
and the other ismonotonical closedness.67 However, dispensing with the former
condition, we alternatively prove it under a weaker condition thanmonotonical
closedness. While Schummer's conditions seem to be dened from the view-
point of the sort of types admissible for each agent, our condition is dened from
5A domain£ is smoothly connected if, for all i 2N and all µi ,µ0i 2£i , there existsw : X £[0,1]!
R such that
(i) For all y 2 [0,1], there exists µyi 2£i such that w(¢, y)Æ vi (¢,µ
y
i ),
(ii) w(¢,0)Æ vi (¢,µi ),
(iii) w(¢,1)Æ vi (¢,µ0i ),
(iv) For all x 2 X , w(x, ¢) is differentiable on [0,1],
(v) There exists z 2R such that, for all x 2 X and all y 2 [0,1], we have
¯¯¯¯
@w(x, y)
@y
¯¯¯¯
· z.
6Adomain£ ismonotonically closed if, for all i 2N , all µi 2£i , and all x 2 X , there exists µ0i 2£i
such that, for all x0 2 X \ {x}, we have
vi (x,µi )¡ vi (x0,µi )Ç vi (x,µ0i )¡ vi (x0,µ0i ).
7These conditions imply an innite number of types in each type set. However, under the
single-peakedness assumption, a nite and small number of types is enough for us to show the
constancy of bribe-proof rules (see Example 1 in Mizukami (2000)).
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that of the interconnection among types rather than the sort of them. To formu-
late the condition, we provide additional notation. Given µi 2 £i , the maximal
set of vi (¢,µi ) in X isP (vi (¢,µi )) :Æ argmax
x2X
vi (x,µi ). When the set is a singleton,
we denote its unique element by p(vi (¢,µi )) and call it the peak of vi (¢,µi ).
The following is our domain-richness condition, which requires that there
exists a pair (i , j ) satisfying the following: for any distinct alternatives x, y 2 X ,
(i) agent i has a relatively steeper valuation function whose peak is x and for
which, for any other alternative x 0 2 X , the difference of values between x and
x 0 is strictly greater than that of values between them for a valuation function of
agent j whose peak is x 0, and (ii) agent j also has a relatively steeper valuation
function whose peak is y and for which, for any other alternative y 0 2 X , the dif-
ference of values between y and y 0 is strictly greater than that of values between
them for a valuation function of agent i whose peak is y 0.
Denition5 (MutualDominance). Adomain satisesmutual dominance if there
exists a pair (i , j ) with i 6Æ j such that, for any distinct x, y 2 X , there exist µi with
p(vi (¢,µi ))Æ x and µ j with p(v j (¢,µ j ))Æ y satisfying the following:
(i) For µi and any x 0 2 X \ {x}, there exists µ0j with p(v j (¢,µ0j )) Æ x 0 such that
v j (x 0,µ0j )¡ v j (x,µ0j )Ç vi (x,µi )¡ vi (x 0,µi ).
(ii) For µ j and any y 0 2 X \ {y}, there exists µ0i with p(vi (¢,µ0i )) Æ y 0 such that
vi (y 0,µ0i )¡ vi (y,µ0i )Ç v j (y,µ j )¡ v j (y 0,µ j ).
Note thatmutual dominance is independent of single-peakedness. In fact, there
is a domainwhich satisesmutual dominance but does not contain single-peaked
valuation functions at all.
Now we introduce an impossibility theorem, which states that any bribe-
proof rule must be exclusive if a domain satises mutual dominance. That is,
any bribe-proof rule always excludes at least one agent from the social decision
mechanism.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a domain £ satises mutual dominance. If a social
choice function f is bribe-proof it is exclusive.
Proof. Suppose that f is not exclusive, then, for all h 2 N , there exist µ¡h 2£¡h
and distinct xh ,x
0
h 2 X such that xh ,x 0h 2 Oh(µ¡h). That is, by the denition of
the option set, for all h 2 N , there exist µ¡h 2 £¡h and distinct µh ,µ0h 2 £h such
that f (µh ,µ¡h)Æ xh and f (µ0h ,µ¡h)Æ x 0h .
Since the domain satises mutual dominance, there exists a pair (i , j ) with
i 6Æ j such that, for distinct f (µ), f (µ0i ,µ¡i ) 2 X , there exist µ¯i with p(vi (¢, µ¯i )) Æ
f (µ) and µ¯ j with p(v j (¢, µ¯ j ))Æ f (µ0i ,µ¡i ) satisfying the following:
(i) For µ¯i and any x 2 X \ { f (µ)}, there exists µ j with p(v j (¢, µ j )) Æ x such that
v j ( x, µ j )¡ v j ( f (µ), µ j )Ç vi ( f (µ), µ¯i )¡ vi ( x, µ¯i ).
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(ii) For µ¯ j and any y 2 X \ { f (µ0i ,µ¡i )}, there exists µi with p(vi (¢, µi )) Æ y such
that vi ( y , µi )¡ vi ( f (µ0i ,µ¡i ), µi )Ç v j ( f (µ0i ,µ¡i ), µ¯ j )¡ v j ( y , µ¯ j ).
We do not change types other than types of agents i and j , so we describe type
proles (¢, ¢,µ¡i , j ) as (¢, ¢) hereafter.
By strategy-proofness, agent i 's changes from (µ) to (µ¯i ,µ j ) and vice versa
imply f (µ¯i ,µ j )Æ f (µ); otherwise, because p(vi (¢, µ¯i ))Æ f (µ) wehave vi ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ¯i )Ç
vi ( f (µ), µ¯i ), which is contradicting strategy-proofness. Similarly, by strategy-
proofness, agent j 's changes from (µ0i ,µ j ) to (µ
0
i , µ¯ j ) and vice versa imply f (µ
0
i , µ¯ j )Æ
f (µ0i ,µ j ); otherwise, because p(v j (¢, µ¯ j )) Æ f (µ0i ,µ j ) we have v j ( f (µ0i , µ¯ j ), µ¯ j ) Ç
v j ( f (µ0i ,µ j ), µ¯ j ), which is contradicting strategy-proofness.
Step 1: f (µ¯i ,µ j )Æ f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ).
Suppose not, then, by the denition ofmutual dominance, for µ¯i with p(vi (¢, µ¯i ))Æ
f (µ) Æ f (µ¯i ,µ j ) and f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ) 2 X \ { f (µ¯i ,µ j )}, there exists µ j with p(v j (¢, µ j )) Æ
f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ) such that
v j ( f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ), µ j )¡ v j ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ j )Ç vi ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ¯i )¡ vi ( f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ), µ¯i ). (1)
By strategy-proofness, agent j 's changes from (µ¯i , µ¯ j ) to (µ¯i , µ j ) and vice versa
imply f (µ¯i , µ j ) Æ f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ); otherwise, because p(v j (¢, µ j )) Æ f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ) we have
v j ( f (µ¯i , µ j ), µ j )Ç v j ( f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ), µ j ), which is contradicting strategy-proofness. There-
fore, by (1),
v j ( f (µ¯i , µ j ), µ j )¡ v j ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ j )Ç vi ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ¯i )¡ vi ( f (µ¯i , µ j ), µ¯i )
vi ( f (µ¯i , µ j ), µ¯i )Å v j ( f (µ¯i , µ j ), µ j )Ç vi ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ¯i )Å v j ( f (µ¯i ,µ j ), µ j ),
which is contradicting bribe-proofness.
Step 2: f (µ0i , µ¯ j )Æ f (µ¯i , µ¯ j ).
By an argument similar to Step 1, we can prove Step 2.
Thus, we have f (µ)Æ f (µ¯i ,µ j )Æ f (µ¯i , µ¯ j )Æ f (µ0i , µ¯ j )Æ f (µ0i ,µ j ): a contradic-
tion because f (µ) 6Æ f (µ0i ,µ j ). ç
Finally, strengthening Denition 5, we introduce another sort of impossibil-
ity theorem, which corresponds to Theorem 4 in Schummer (2000). The dis-
tinction between Denitions 5 and 6 is the number of pairs required to satisfy
Conditions (i) and (ii).
Denition 6 (Strong Mutual Dominance). 8 A domain satises strong mutual
dominance if for all i 2 N there exists a partner j 2 N \ {i } such that, for any
distinct x, y 2 X , there exist µi with p(vi (¢,µi )) Æ x and µ j with p(v j (¢,µ j )) Æ y
satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii) in Denition 5.
8This condition is similar to dual dominance provided by Saijo (1987), where he proved that
Maskin monotonic social choice functions must be constant if the domain satises dual domi-
nance.
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Note that this condition is implied by monotonical closedness, which requires
that, for any valuation function and any alternative x 2 X , there exists another
valuation function for which the value of x, relative to any other alternative, is
strictly greater than that of x for the original function. Accordingly, by deni-
tion, monotonical closedness implies that the differences of valuations between
any two alternatives in X are not each bounded. Then, for any alternative x 2 X ,
each agent has a relatively steeper valuation function, the maximal set of which
is {x} and for which, for any other alternative x 0 2 X , the difference of values be-
tween x and x 0 is strictly greater than that of values between them for a valuation
function of each of the other agents, the maximal set of which is {x 0}. Therefore
strong mutual dominance is implied by monotonical closedness.
In Theorem1, the condition ofmutual dominance requires at least one agent
to partner another, so that the bribe-proof rule reects no type represented by
the pair. Correspondingly, in Theorem 2, the condition of strong mutual dom-
inance requires each agent to partner another, so that the bribe-proof rule ne-
glects any type reported by the pairs, that is, by every agent.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a domain £ satises strong mutual dominance. A so-
cial choice function f is bribe-proof if and only if it is constant.
By an argument similar to Theorem 1, we can prove Theorem 2. Note that our
dominance conditions are both compatible with the niteness of X . Therefore
our theorems hold in the case where X is nite.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, wehave provided a generalization of Schummer's Theorem4which
states that a social choice function satises bribe-proofness if and only if it is a
constant function. Our main result, Theorem 2, differs from his Theorem 4 on
two points. First, whereas he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions,
we alternatively prove it under the strong mutual dominance condition which
is implied by his one condition and without the other condition. Furthermore,
he assumes that the set of alternatives is compact, whereas we do not. Second,
our condition holds whether the set of alternatives is innite or not, while his
conditions do not. Exploring whether we can design a non-trivial bribe-proof
rule in other models would be an important topic for further investigation.
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